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UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING SECURITY COUNCIL PRESENTATION

1. Our request for a Security Council meeting should be presented to the Secretary General at the same time as the President's speech. Advance leakage may require presentation to head off a Soviet request even before the President's speech. (Zorin is in the chair this month.) The request should also include our resolution, otherwise Zorin may get one in before we do as he will be immediately notified of our request for a meeting by the Secretary General.
2. The Security Council must meet Tuesday morning, even though the OAS will not have acted by that time, in order to forestall a Soviet resolution demanding we call off our blockade. Our case would rest before the OAS resolution on self-defense against an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the UN Charter. After the OAS resolution, we would also be reporting activity under Article 54.
3. The blockade must be in effect before the Security Council meeting, otherwise a cease and desist order may issue.
4. We must give special attention to Venezuela, Chile and Ireland, members of the Security Council. We will need all of their votes in order to assure 7 votes in support of our resolution. We will also need a supporting speech by Venezuela on the first day if possible.
5. Voting support from Chile can only come from Santiago in view of the attitude of the U.N. Ambassador. Aiken, Foreign Minister of Ireland, is in New York now and we can talk to him. But special emissaries may be necessary to Venezuela and Chile.
6. The U.K., France, Venezuela, Chile and Ireland must be told about our political as well as our military position in advance, otherwise we may not get their support.
7. The messages being sent to OAS, NATO and other countries should include not only the area steps (e.g. OAS action) and military steps we are asking them to take but also the political moves we will be making through the Security Council.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *LB* DATE *2/16/68*

EXAMINED BY *LB*

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FOR 10 OF EACH YEAR

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8. The principal non-allies should be informed by messages, from the President Monday night, which would include our political program as well as our military steps. Otherwise, they may react before they know the facts and our real objectives.

9. Whether or not the Security Council or General Assembly may have acted on our resolution, no UN presence can be established in Cuba without Soviet consent, which will probably not be forthcoming before a Summit meeting. Hence we must assume that the base build-up may continue pending a broad political settlement reached at the Summit. A full political program (UN observers, territorial integrity of Cuba, and evacuation of foreign bases) proposed now might well attract so much general support that the Soviets would stop further build-up pending the Summit and make an air strike unnecessary.

10. In any event a very early Summit meeting will probably be essential to bring about a sufficient degree of settlement to enable us to lift our blockade. It is also likely Soviets will, within very few days, have taken action requiring Security Council and Summit consideration of Berlin.

For the foregoing reasons, I must know as promptly as possible:

1. When is the President's speech to be given exactly?
2. When is the blockade to be effective to head off Russian action in the Security Council? The President's speech should at least give the impression that the blockade is in force forthwith.
3. When can we realistically expect the OAS resolution?
4. When will the U.K., France, Venezuela, Chile and Ireland be informed about the facts and our political as well as our military position, and by whom?
5. To prepare speech and resolution for the Security Council we must know what the President is willing to propose in the first instance, or for me to propose, for a political settlement and, if possible, what he is willing to accept.

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6. What is present thinking about the follow-up air strike? What events must take place to at least postpone it?

Adlai E. Stevenson

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